variable geometry engine intake doors at transsonic speeds. This is a peculiar feature in supersonic transport (SST) aircraft, as it is necessary at all stages of flight to present air at the engine intake and compressor face at subsonic speed before it is allowed to pass through the engine. This is accomplished by reducing the airflow to the engine by closing the aperture of the engine intake as the aircraft becomes transsonic. These doors are controlled electronically and if a malfunction occurs during the transsonic phase of flight the aircraft is unable to become supersonic. On deceleration from supersonic flight, excess air is bled from spill doors beneath the engines. One serious turbine disc failure has occurred in an Air France aircraft causing severe damage to the engine nacelle and wing. Happily, the aircraft was able to land safely.
On take-off, 100% power is applied with the use of after-burners on all four engines. The latter are cancelled shortly after lift-off if noise-infringement levels are to be avoided. In areas such as New York special handling techniques are required, as the Port of New York Authority has set a maximum noise level on take-off of 112 EPNdB (estimated pressure noise decibels), necessitating a steep turn towards the sea shortly after take-off to avoid built-up areas, with consequent reduction in power settings.
Air-traffic control authorities have become used to SST aircraft operating through their airspace, and as the aircraft operates just like any other subsonic aircraft in terminal areas no particular problems have arisen.
The aircraft is climbed at 300 knots to 10 000 ft (3050 m) then to 28 000 ft (8540 m) at 350 knots until the acceleration pointwhich West-bound is over the Bristol Channel and Eastbound at Hyannis on the Cape Cod Peninsulawhen 100% power is again selected, introducing the afterburners in pairs, the two inners first and the two outers second. The aircraft accelerates through Mach 1 to 50 000 ft (15 250 m), maintaining 100% power but cancelling the afterburners after becoming supersonic. This power-setting is maintained, the aircraft gradually climbing at Mach 2.02 until the deceleration point some 2867 nautical miles (5304 km) from London, when power is reduced and the aircraft decelerates to Mach 1, descending over Hyannis in Cape Cod and down Long Island Sound towards John F Kennedy Airport. Navigation is carried out by means of three, linked, inertial navigation systems (INS). The computed way-points adjusted to the high-altitude winds are printed on cards and fed to the INS, the aircraft turning automatically at the way-points on the great-circle route.
Full automatic landing capability is provided to Category 3 by means of two coupled autopilots, allowing the aircraft to make an approach and landing in zero weather conditions.
Crew training and experience
Due to the rigid seniority system imposed by pilots' unions, some problems have been seen in converting older pilots to the aircraft. The main problem in the older pilot seems to be his lack of ability to keep ahead of the aircraft which is travelling, of course, very fast indeed at 1350 miles (2173.5 km) per hour, faster than the speed of a rifle bullet. This, in addition to monitoring new systems such as centre of gravity and fuel-balancing problems not seen in other transport aircraft, has resulted in about 25% of the more senior pilots failing to make the grade. Such a failure can, of course, be a severe psychological blow to a senior captain and various 'stress conditions' have been seen in these cases, some of whom have had to retire prematurely from their respective airlines. Air France, in addition, have noted some psychological problems in young co-pilots, particularly regarding their attitude to the older captain. We have not seen this, and Concorde crews seem to work well together in British Airways. As a result of these experiences it is now British Airways' policy that pilots must have five years clear employment ahead of them, which means that anyone over 49 years of age will not be converted to Concorde.
Neither airline invested in their own simulators due to the very high costs involved and, as a result, make use of the very sophisticated simulator at Sud-Aviation, Toulouse, and the systems trainers at British Aerospace at Filton, Bristol. Base flying with the real aircraft is extremely expensive and therefore much dependence is put on the use of simulators.
Physiological considerations
At 60 000 ft (18 300 m) cruising altitude, a total loss of cabin pressure would result in disaster. It was recognized at an early stage that as 100% oxygen only gave protection to the healthy adult to about 40 000 ft (12 200 m), a radically improved pressure-breathing system had to be provided for the crews of SST aircraft. (Therapeutic oxygen is provided for 10% of passengers on Concorde, as it is on all subsonic aircraft, and can be made available to passengers who need it; this is required by the Air Navigations Orders). The one-handed, quick-donning mask which was developed in both France and the UK by the RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine (IAM) and eventually manufactured by Intertechnique of Paris has proved satisfactory in service, and although there have been no instances of loss of cabin pressure in either airline the system does give protection in most situations with a maximum mask pressure of 30 mmHg. Pressure-breathing training has been given to all technical flying staff on a rig which was first provided by IAM at Farnborough but is now situated at Heathrow, and all trainees, including cabin crew, are given medical lectures on the environmental problems likely to be faced in the aircraft. In addition, all prospective crew members are given a copy of the booklet 'Medical Aspects of Supersonic Flight', which covers all the physiological problems and was produced by the medical departments of Air France and British Airways. Considerable technical discussions took place with the respective trade unions before the aircraft entered service and this greatly allayed fears from that quarter, particularly regarding cosmic radiation hazards.
Cosmic radiation
Concorde carries a sophisticated radiation meter which measures neutron dosage and ionizing radiations at all altitudes of flight. The original system was largely developed by the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston and consists of a detector unit housed in the passenger compartment and a display unit on the flight engineer's panel. The radiations at SST cruising altitudes are neutrons and ionizing radiations (mainly protons); these are measured separately, the neutron component by a boron trifluoride (BF3) proportioned counter and the ionizing element by miniature Geiger-Muller counters.
Although the UK Medical Research Council originally advised that 100 mrem/h should be the radiation level at which descent action should be taken by the captain, the French radiobiologists insisted on an action figure of 50 mrem/h. Despite this seemingly severely limiting figure, at no time has descent action been necessary in an SST despite our experiencing a supposedly solar active year in 1979. In fact, 1979 proved to be a fairly quiet year as far as solar activity was concerned. The experience of Air France regarding cosmic radiation has been very similar to that of British Airways.
The total average dose rates for all BA Concorde flying in 1979 was 0.92 mrem/h with a maximum dose rate/of 3.81 mrem/h. In 1980 the corresponding figures were 0.84 mrem/h and 2.79 mrem/h. We are, of course, required to furnish the Civil Aviation Authority with exposure samples from 15% of technical crew (i.e. pilots and flight engineers) and 15% of cabin crew throughout the year. For 1979 these were for technical crew 275 mrem/year and for cabin crew 219 mrem/year, with maximum possible exposures of 1079-1741 mrem/year for technical crew and 830-1299 mrem/year for cabin crew. In 1980 the annual results were 249 mrem/year and 225 mrem/year and maximum possible exposures of 963-1656 mrem/year and 769-991 mrem/year respectively. The years 1981 The years , 1982 The years and 1983 have been very similar.
These figures are well within the International Commission on Radiological Protection permitted maximum of 5 rem/year and do not constitute a radiation hazard to crew or passengers.
Ozone
Although considerable concern has been shown in the US regarding high levels of cabin ozone in subsonic aircraft, particularly the Boeing 747SP at altitudes above 38 000 ft (11 590 m), this has not been our experience in Concorde and cabin levels above 0.1 ppm are very rare and are more probably in the region of 0.004 ppm.
In studies carried out by the UK as part of the Tripartite Agreement on Stratospheric Monitoring, ambient ozone levels have been measured using a DASIBI ozone monitor. Although Concorde has flown through levels where the ozone concentration is in excess of the threshold limit value (TLV), no excessive levels have been measured in the cabin. This is partly due to the fact that ozone in the ambient air drawn into the compressor stage of the engine reaches a temperature of 500°C, so that considerable degradation of the ozone takes placenearly 100%. Further work by British Aerospace in 1978 over the Bay of Biscay showed resultant cabin ozone levels of 0.004 ppm with outside ambient ozone levels of 0.3-1.0 ppm between 29 000 ft (8845 m) and 36 000 ft (10 980 m). Ozone has not, therefore, been a problem in Concorde, nor is it expected to be in the future.
Conclusion
The success of the Concorde venture was not a haphazard affair by any means. It was realized at a very early design stage that this aircraft presented many new problems, not the least being the physiological problems in protecting passengers and crew members from the extremely hostile environment of high altitude, high ozone levels and cosmic radiation.
As far as invalid or incapacitated passengers are concerned, Concorde offers a much safer environment than the conventional subsonic jet aircraft. Firstly, the cabin is maintained at a much lower altitude than subsonic aircraft, i.e. 5000 ft (1525 m) as against 8000 ft (24 m). Secondly, the travel time is markedly reduced; for example, London/New York takes 3 h 20 min against 6 h 40 min by 747. This reduces travel fatigue considerably.
There are therefore no particular bars to invalid or incapacitated passengers travelling supersonic as against subsonic, and in reality supersonic travel may well be to their advantage. Unfortunately, due to the small plug-tight doors, loading difficulties prevent the carriage of stretcher cagses But apart from this, most other types of invalids can be safely carried.
